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The Place and Function of Pure Equity
in the Structure of Law
By RALPH A. NEwmAN*
The Various Meanings of Equity
A MONG the many anomalies of equity, one which has frequently
attracted the attention of students of comparative law is the fact that
in the civil law countries, in which equity has been almost completely
absorbed into the general body of the law, there is no branch of the
law called equity; there are no courses in equity given in the universi-
ties, and the very concept of equity is unfamiliar to most civilian
lawyers.' The confused approach to equity in the United States is
indicated by the fact that in many law schools there is no separate
course in equity; in other schools, equity is taught as a separate course
of comparable status with other traditional courses such as contracts,
property and torts, and in some schools equity is looked upon as a
part of the course in judicial remedies. These different approaches
to the teaching of equity reflect our attitude toward it as an indefinite
area of law which is doubtless of great importance, but which is
annoyingly elusive to the grasp. Whichever approach is adopted, the
student is apt to carry away a conception of equity as a body of rules,
many of them obviously different from and often in direct contradic-
tion to those he studies in other courses, but he is left without any clear
idea as to why the rules are different, or as to when they should or
should not be applied.
In Anglo-American law, equity is commonly looked upon as a
component of law which is relevant primarily in suits for specific relief,
and irrelevant in most actions for damages. From this view of equity
the feeling has developed that equitable principles come into opera-
tion because specific relief is sought, reversing the true relationship
between the substantive principles of equity, and remedies, which is
C Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law.
1 Razi, Reflections on Equity in the Civil Law System, 13 Am. U.L. 11Ev. 24 (1963).
"The continental legal systems do not.., recognize any such difference as that which
exists in our system between law and equity." GCuTIERIDG, CoMPwARATrvE LAw 94
(2d ed. 1949). "The distinction [between law and equity] has never been known on
the Continent or in Latin-America." AmvmNJon, NoLDE & WoLFF, ThArrn DE. norr
colvmxAit 127 (1950). "French law makes no distinction between law and equity."
Lawson, The Approach to French Law, 34 IND. L.J. 531,541 (1959).
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that specific relief is granted in order to implement equitable objectives
more effectively. Uncertainty exists not only as to the nature of the
relationship between law and equity but also as to the nature of equity
itself, and the word "equity" has become a hollow word largely devoid
of specific content. Not the least important reason for the prevailing
uncertainty as to the relationship between law and equity is the fact
that equity is generally taught as a separate course, which has the
tendency to place it apart from the rest of the law. As Professor
Lawson has expressed the thought, "a body of law taught for many
generations creates inhibitions in lawyers who have passed through
a traditional education in it. It forms a conceptual structure of legal
thought from which lawyers escape only with difficulty."2
An important reason for the uncertainty as to the nature of equity
is the fact that the word "equity" is used in seven different senses;
in the sense of what is fair and just,8 in the sense of natural law,4 in
2 LAwsoN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 534. "Propositions seem to us self-evident
simply because it has never occurred to us to doubt them." Cohen, Law and Scientific
Method, 6 Ar. L. REv. 235 (1928). "Judges . . . set up a wall down the middle
of every court of complete legal and equitable powers . . . and continue to treat
a court of general jurisdiction as two courts in one." Pound, quoted in Coo,
5 LE TUREs ON LEGAL Topics 1923-24 (1928). "The truth of the matter is, I am sure,
that the so-called 'fusion' of law and equity was a procedural matter and [save
incidentally and because procedural matters cannot under our system sensibly be
divorced from substantive law] the function of equity in relation to the common law
was not thereby changed." Evershed, Equity Is Not To Be Presumed To Be Past the
Age of Child-Bearing, 1 SYDNEY L. REv. 1, 4 (1953). "[T]he attempt is still largely
unrealized, to secure a real union of law and equity." CLAKn, Preface to CASES ON
PLEADING AND PaocEDUrE n.3 (1934). In New York, in spite of provisions of the codes of
procedure which abolished the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity,*
"the substantive distinctions have been preserved." APPLETON, NEW YORK PRACTICE 87
(5th ed. 1951). In the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "the change is one of
procedure rather than remedy. The substantive distinctions between equitable and
legal remedies have not been erased. Only procedural distinctions have been abolished.
The substantive principles of equity for balancing rights and obligations, are not
superseded . . . . The rules have not . . . changed the principles which guide the
courts in granting or refusing injunctive relief." BARRON & HoLrzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PuocEDuRE § 141 (1950). Ridder, in Aequitas und Equity, 39 Ancmv FU REcns-
tND SocULPHILosoPm 181 (1951), says of the fusion of law and equity in English
law by the Judicature Act of 1875 that "dadurch ist aber keine Fusion von Common
Law und Equity eingetreten" (no fusion of common law and equity has been
achieved). "The Code reform appears, and the distinction between courts of law and
courts of equity is abolished. Yet the emotional need for a government which is moral
and rational on the one hand, and benevolent and merciful on the other, still persists."
ARNOLD, Tm SYmBoLs OF GovEaRaENr 63 (1935).
8 DIGEST 1. 1.1; AusTIN, JuusPRUDENcE 640 (1879). "The plain man preserves
a fresher and less sophisticated sense of natural justice than the lawyer, who is
trained to look elsewhere for guidance." Amos, The Legal Mind, 49 L.Q. Rlzv. 27,
36 (1933).
4 See MARSHALL, NATURA-. JUsTIcE 6-20 (1959).
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the sense of a system of law which corrects failures of justice in the
main body of the law,5 in the sense of a theory of justice in which the
operation of legal precepts is adjusted to the exigencies of special
circumstances," in the sense of a body of law which was administered
in the English Court of Chancery when it was a separate court,7 in
the sense, in civil law, of a method of liberal interpretation of code
provisions in accordance with the spirit and general purpose of the
statute,8 and, in Anglo-American law, in the sense of a body of legal
precepts which introduce into the law, in suits for specific relief,
criteria of justice which are based on higher ethical values than those
which are ordinarily required in actions for damages.9
An Analysis of the Different Meanings of
the Word "Equity"
In the general sense of what is fair and just, equity is virtually
synonymous with law, since the purpose of all law is to do justice as
it is envisaged at the place and time. Natural law provides only a
pseudo-solution of the problem of the nature of equity. The laws of
nature are equated with justice, but the necessity of discovering the
laws of nature through reason merely remits us to the original problem
of what is fair and just. The distinction between natural law and equity
has never been clearly drawn; in some civil codes natural law,'0 in
others, equity," is referred to as the source for filling gaps in the posi-
5 ArusroiE, Nicom amcN ETHICs Bk. 5, c. 10; ST. GEEmArN, DoCTOR AND
STEmmr Dial. 1, ch. 16 (1530).
8 "All legal experience shows that the power of adjusting the operation of legal
precepts to the exigencies of special circumstances is unavoidable if there is to be
a complete system of justice under law." Pound, Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation:
The Problem of the Individual Special Case, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 925, 936 (1960).
Equity is "la givstizia del caso singelo" (the justice of the single case). 1 Dust,
INST]TUZIONI DE DmrrrO CrVLE 49 (2d ed. 1930). See also DEussms, EssM sTM .A.
NoTIoN D'EQurrk 5-6 (1934).
7 MAITLAND, EQuITY 1 (2d ed. 1936).
8 Di. VEccHiO, PmILosopHy OF LAw 282 (8th ed. 1952). There are references to
"equita" in several articles of the ITALIAN Crvm CoDE, arts. 1374, 1450, 1467, 1468,
1651, 1660, 1664, 1733, 1736, 1751, 1755, 2045, 2047, 2056, 2109, 2110, 2118, 2120.
92 KENT, CommENTmrm s 826 (14th ed. 1896).
10 ARGENTINE CIVIL CODE art. 16; AusTRI&N CIVIL CODE art. 7; AVANT-PROJECT,
FRENCH CivIr. CODE art. 21; CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY LAw OF GHANA art. 4.
11 The EGYPTIAN CODE art. 4, provides for "equity and justice" (1948). The
codes of Colombia, Equador, and Honduras, infra, provide for "natural equity." The
CmNESE Cmxv CODE art. 1, the ITALIAN CIVIL CODE art. 12, the PORTUCESE CrVL
CODE art. 16, and the SPANISH Crvm CODE art. 6 provide for "the general principles
of law" (in the ITALIAN CrvIL CODE the reference is to "the general principles of law
of the legal system of the State") (the provision in the SPANISH CrVm CODE derives
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tive law. Natural law is primarily concerned with the relationship
between the state and the individual, centering about the problem
of the rights of man; and in private law the concepts of natural law
are so general as hardly to provide a guide to justice.
As to the theory that the function of equity is to correct failures
of justice resulting from the operation of the rules of strict law, it is
meaningless, since moral considerations are no longer deemed irrele-
vant, to continue to talk and think of part of the law continuing to
tolerate failures of justice which require correction by another part;'
although it is difficult to explain the dual standard of morality in
Anglo-American law on any other ground. In the sense of a system of
legal norms which are sufficiently flexible to lend themselves to adjust-
ment to the facts of each case, it seems clear that, although the nature
of equitable norms is such that they are susceptible of more flexible
application than many norms of common law, there are many other
common law concepts, for example causation, due care, reasonable
time for the performance of obligations, and reasonable use of property,
which are applied with considerable flexibility.' Accordingly it can
hardly be said that this characteristic is the exclusive province of
equity. Maitland's often quoted definition of equity as a body of law
originally applied in the English Court of Chancery when it was a
separate court 4 is merely an identification rather than an explanation,
and was obviously not intended as a serious definition. The theory of
equity as a liberal interpretation of codes to reach the spirit of the
statute merely raises the problem of the nature of equity and does not
provide an answer, since the process goes, of necessity, beyond the
ordinary meaning of interpretation. The last sense in which the word
"equity' is used-to describe a body of juridical criteria which are
applied in suits for specific relief and which are based on a system of
more elevated moral values than the criteria which are ordinarily
applied in actions for damages-is a fairly accurate description of
equity in Anglo-American law, but does not indicate the effect of
equity in some areas of our inner common law system or throughout
from the SiETE PA ETmAS). LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 21 (West 1952); C:YE CrviL
CODE art. 24; COLOMBIA CIVM CODE art. 32; EQUADOE CvivL CODE arts. 17, 18;
HONDUnAS CriL CODE art. 20; MoNTENEGRo CODE art. 3 (1887); PiAxs& CrwL CODE
art. 7; Swiss Crvi CODE art. 4; PaoposED GENF.AL LAw PERTAINING To THE APPICA-
TION OF JUDIcIAL NoRMs, BnAsm., art. 9.
12 See RundeU, The Chancellor's Foot: The Nature of Equity, 27 U. KAN. Crry
L. REv. 71, 74 (1958).
'3 Amos, Some Reflections on the Philosophy of Law, 3 C.AM. L. J. 31, 36 (1929).
14 MArrLAND, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1.
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the civil law. This description is not, moreover, completely accurate
even as to the nature of Anglo-American equity, since the juridical
criteria referred to in the definition are merely manifestations of a force
by which the law becomes humanized in conformity with advancing
standards of individual and social morality. None of the customary
usages of the term "equity" indicates the existence of any qualities
which distinguish equity, elsewhere than in the inner system of equity
in Anglo-American law, from law itself.
That equitable principles exist, we know from their presence in
Anglo-American equity and from their earlier presence, in more gen-
eral form, in Roman law. In Anglo-American common law there are
some areas in which the principles of equity are openly recognized,
but this is not so in other areas in which their presence is equally
certain. When the principles of equity have become completely inte-
grated into the common law norms of Anglo-American law or into the
norms of the civil law, they cease to be apparent because they lose,
under such circumstances, their separate identity. In order for us to find
out whether or not the principles of equity exist in some areas of Anglo-
American common law, or in the civil law, we must first determine their
precise nature by an analysis of Anglo-American equity; and then, by
comparing them with the norms of Anglo-American common law and
the norms of the various civil law systems, ascertain whether, or the
extent to which, they have entered into the norms of those systems, in-
cluding our inner common law system. We can then determine, on the
basis of the results of their application in those systems, the question of
whether their further acceptance in those systems would be desirable.
The principles which will be identified in this manner might be termed
principles of pure equity, as distinguished from equity in the general
sense of what is fair and just. It is not the purpose of this paper to
examine in detail the principles of equity or their application in dif-
ferent legal systems, which the writer has attempted to do elsewhere.'
What will rather be attempted is to examine the general nature of
equity, the relationship of equity to law, and the place and function
of equity in the structure of law as a whole.
A Glance at the History of the Evolution of Equity
Since the flowering of Greek philosophic thought in the fifth and
fourth centuries of the pre-Christian era, men have perceived that law
is composed of two conflicting forces, which at times and in some parts
15 See generally NEwmAN, EQurrY AND LAW: A Co r'vxARA STUDY (1961).
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of the world have become almost completely reconciled, and at other
times and in other places have carved out for themselves independent
channels in the jurisprudence of many legal systems. For many ages
these forces have been called strict law and equity, which Aristotle
defined as the correction of law when the law is defective owing to its
universality. 6 In the early stages of legal evolution the cleavage be-
tween law and equity was clear and unyielding, and reconciliation
between the two forces was impossible. Early law is composed of rules
based on common elements of frequently recurring situations which
often differ widely from each other in important respects, even though
the cases are of a generally similar nature. The rules leave little room
for modification to meet the needs of particular cases. Cases are fitted
to the rules by eliminating factors which vary from the typical situa-
tions for which the rules are designed, especially factors involving
moral considerations, which the rules deem irrelevant. 17 In this early
stage of legal evolution the rules of law frequently operate at the
sacrifice of individual justice, 8 since the primary concern of early
law is the maintenance of public order rather than the attainment of
just results in each case. In Chinese customary law it was a criminal
offense to do the wrong thing or to fail to do the right thing, and as
late as 1728 the great T'sing Code consisted almost entirely of rules of
criminal law. The Siete Partidas, the thirteenth centdry code of law
of Spain, provided that "laws should not be made on matters that
seldom occur."19 Change in the rules of law is difficult20 because of the
divine origin of law and the sacred nature of the lawgiver.21
Ethical advances in the law originate outside the established legal
16 A~usTomE, Nicom~cN ETHmcs Bk. 5, c. 10. The literal translation of
Aristotle's term for equity, "tsfxsta," is "clemency." "Aequitas" in Roman law meant
"equality," DEL VEccHIo, PHmosoPHi or LAw 282 (8th ed. 1952). Even before
Aristotle, Plato had written that "the differences of men and actions, and the endless
irregular movements of human beings, do not admit of any universal and simple rule."
PLATO, Woixs ' 2 94a (Jowett transl. 1937). For the meaning of "equita" in Italian
law see text accompanying note 8 supra.
17 1 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 400 (1959).
18Even as late as the middle of the nineteenth century, according to Holdsworth,
"the pursuit of the logical conception was carried out regardless of the consequences
to the parties, with the result that its victory entailed, in a very large number of cases,
the sacrifice of substantial justice." 9 HoLDswoRm, HIsToRY OF ENr-IsH LAw 393
(1926).
19 LAs Smr PARTms, Part VII, last law (1263) (Scott transl. 1931) (the thirteenth
century code of Spain).
20 See 1 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 397 (1959).
2 1 "In early times the judge was also a priest or soothsayer, who sought aid and
inspiration from superstition and magic . CALA r.NrI, P]oCEDURE AND DEMoc-
RAcy 21 (Adams transl. 1956).
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order, and relief from the harsh effects of the rules of law in particular
cases must come from a source external to the law itself. Individual
justice is attained through royal dispensation,22 and we see the begin-
nings of equity in Solomon's prayer for an understanding heart to judge
his people;23 we are not told that he prayed for knowledge of the law.
In some parts of the world the exercise of the royal prerogative of
clemency was delegated to royal officials, as occurred in early English
history when the Chancellor of the Curia Regis became the keeper
of the King's conscience. With the accumulation of precedents, equity
in many countries developed into a system of law based upon definite
principles. In the third century before the Christian era in Rome, and
in England in the twelfth century, equity cast aside its character of
executive clemency and became a part of the legal system. During a
great part of legal history, equity and law in many parts of the world
constitute parallel streams in the total jurisprudence. This was the
case in Roman law until early in the reign of Hadrian,24 in canon law
until the fourteenth century,25 and in biblical law,26 Frankish law2 7
2 2 "In the thirteenth century we find St. Louis administering justice under an oak
at Vincennes, and calling himself the fountain of justice." DuCax, L'HIsTOmE DE FRANCE
171 (1954). At about the same period we find, by a curious coincidence of history,
Henry II following the same process in the Great Hall of Westminster, and at the
opposite end of the earth, the possibly mythical Emperor Shun administering justice
under a pear tree.
23 1 Kings 3:9.
2 4 Shortly before 129 A.D., see LENL, DAs EDICTM PERunTuuM (3d ed. 1927);
Pringsheim, The Legal Policy and the Reforms of Hadrian, 24 J. Rom.N Svunms 141,
143 (1934).
25 Until the beginning of the fourteenth century, canon law was administered at
the Episcopal See at Rome in two courts: the Signatura Justitiae and the Signatura
Gratiae. Equity was an extraordinary remedy, S.R.R. Decisiones, Rome, tome 5, 193; see
Lef~bvre, Le Role de requite en droit canonique, 7 EpHnmmms Irums cANoNici (Italy)
137, 151 (1951). In the fourteenth century a series of Papal decretals brought the
adoption of the function of relief in cases of extreme hardship, until that time adminis-
tered in the Signatura Gratiae, into the system of law administered in the Signatura
Justitiae. The signaturae of the Roman Curia were not duplicated in the diocesan curiae.
See also LEFBvE, Recours d 'ofice du juge, DicroNNAEn DE- DRorr CANONIQuE
(France) fas. xxxi, col. 208 (1954).
26 In biblical law there were two systems, the levitical law and the doctrine of
lifnim mi-shuras ha-din, meaning literally "beyond the line of the law." This doctrine
required, in both biblical and post-biblical times, the application of less technical rules.
The 613 biblical commandments of the Pentatuch were rigorously applied, but the
rabbinic elaborations upon them, although equally binding, were given in cases of doubt
a more lenient interpretation. See 2 Mooax, JuDAism 139-146 (1927).
27 Toward the end of the eighth century there was for a time a separation of
Frankish law from Konigsrecht, 1 BRUNNEB, DAs DEuTscHEN REcHTs GEscHaIrHE 528
(1892). This separation may have been due to the fact that the Frankish period was
"the flourishing period of . . . symbolism." HEusLER, 1 INsTrrUTIONS OF GERMANIc
PRIv AE LAw 70, 74, quoted in 9 WiGoMRE, EvmENCE § 2405 (3d ed. 1940).
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and medieval Spanish law.28 In English law, equity and common law
constituted a single system from the early part of the twelfth century
until the middle of the fourteenth, 9 when the legal system split
asunder, and for the next five centuries equity and law flowed in
separate channels.
In most parts of the world, equity and law ultimately merged into
unitary legal systems in which the principles of equity were integrated
into the main body of the law; but always the clashing objectives of
certainty and ideal justice have prevented a complete integration.
There remain even in such integrated systems of law areas in which
the acceptance of equitable principles is far from complete.30 As Piero
Calamandri has expressed it, there are "open windows of the Palace of
Reason, through which, despite the best laid plans, the wind of ir-
rationality blows."3' In closed civil law systems such as the French
legal system, where there is no formal opportunity for the reception
of equitable doctrine not already forming part of the code norms, the
reception of equitable doctrine must be achieved clandestinely, giving
rise to great difficulty in ethical growth. Pound not long before his
death pointed out that the capital problem of the science of law today
is to, establish an equilibrium between the competing objectives of
certainty and ideal justice; how to find, as he put it, "the right place
for discretion, dispensation and mitigation in a system of administra-
tion of justice in the unified world of tomorrow."
2
Pound has pointed out five stages in the evolution of law: primitive
28 LAS SEET.n PASITIAS, op. cit. supra note 19, at Part III, tit. 4, law 23. A distinc-
tion existed in medieval Spanish law between arbitrators of law and amicable com-
pounders, "amigables componedores," who were to decide the controversy in any way
they deemed proper.
29 In the twelfth century equity and common law constituted a single system, Adams,
The Origin of English Equity, 16 CoLum. L. REv. 87 (1916). Professor Adams is of the
opinion that equity did not appear as a separate system until the fourteenth century,
by which time the common law had become relatively inflexible. GLAmvr, Bk. 7, c. 1
seems to support this view; and see BPAcroN, NoTE Booer (1235-36) n.3.
30 See Bonassies, review of NEW'mN, EQuIY AND LAw: A Colmn7AsRAvE STUDY,
60 REv. nTmENATiONALE DE DROrr coMARE (France) 822 (1962); Newman, La
funzione della pura equita nel diritto moderno, 40 REV. MTERNAZIONALE D. FMLOSOFIA.
Dm Dnmrro (Italy) 647, nn. 10-16 (1963). In Italian law the right to rescission does
not continue if the plaintiff has performed. ITALIAN CIvIL CODE art. 1458. In Hungarian
law rescission on the ground of economic impossibility is allowed only if the other party
would have received a disproportionately high profit, M.D. (Maganjogi Dontvenytar,
Collection of Decisions of Civil Law Cases), Case No. 3182/1933. As to the limited
application of the doctrine of frustration in Spanish Law, see Sentencia March 25, 1912,
cited in 2 BRUTAU, FUNDAmmNTOS DE DEBECHo CrvI 374 (1954).
3 1 CALAm.NonDE, op. cit. supra note 21, at 21.
82 Pound, Introduction to NEwmAN, EQuITY AND LAw: A CoM RAxTm STuny
(1962).
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law, which is concerned only with maintaining peace; strict law, in
which the interest shifts to stability of the economic order, and a
characteristic of which is a refusal to take account of the moral aspect
of situations or transactions; equity and natural law, in which the
doctrines of equity mitigate the harsh effects of the rules of strict law,
and in which concern is directed primarily to individual rights; the
maturity of law, in which the relaxations of the strict law take form in
definite legal norms; and finally the still evolving contemporary stage
of what Pound has called the socialization of law, in which emphasis
is being gradually transferred from individual interests to social in-
terests.83 Pound's description of the evolution of law clearly reveals that
the ethical progress of the law has been largely charted by the princi-
ples of equity. In primitive law, equity has no place. In the second
stage, that of strict law, equity exists apart from law. In the third stage
equity constitutes an auxiliary system of administration of justice. In
the fourth stage the principles of equity combine, in most legal sys-
tems, with the principles of strict law. Examples of such integrated
norms in the civil law are the doctrines of relief for unilateral mistake
in contracting, and of condemnation of conduct consisting of varying
degrees of cunning which fall short of actual fraud as defined in the
common law. In the contemporary stage of legal evolution the norms
of law frequently provide for a sharing, between the participants in
the occurrence or transaction, or even by the whole community, of the
responsibility for the results of misfortune to one of the participants.
The fundamental principles of equity have expanded to include what
Pound has called "the humanitarian idea . . . of lifting or shifting
burdens and losses ... so as to put them upon those better able to
bear them." 4 He has noted "the tendency to insist, not as was the view
of legal writers in the nineteenth century, that the debtor keep faith
in all cases even though it ruin him and his family, but that the creditor
also must take a risk, either along with, or in some cases instead of,
the debtor." 5 Law is coming more and more to recognize, under the
influence of equity, the social interest in the individual life. In view
of the immense influence of equity on the development of law, it is of
the utmost importance that we should be able to identify the areas
in which the principles of equity are relevant, and to understand the
reasons for their absence in other areas.
Aristotle's definition of equity as the correction of law when the
33 1 POUND, JuRispnuRDEcNE 367-459 (1959).
84 Pound, Promise or Bargain?, 33 TuiL. L. REv. 455, 457 (1959).
85 POUND, AN IRmODUCTION TO THE Pmiosorp- OF THE LAW 162 (1921).
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law is defective owing to its universality was accurate in a stage of
legal evolution when the rules of law were based on the common ele-
ments of typical situations, and when the forms of law were identified
with law itself. Now that law is no longer sacred and unchangeable,
there is no further need to resort to forces outside the law in order to
correct instances of failure of justice. The rules of law open to receive
the doctrines of equity, and the correction of law comes about within
the law itself. At this stage in the evolution of law there is no longer
need for an equitable system separate from the main body of the law.
Equity loses its separate identity; equity and law coalesce, and equity
becomes an integral part of a unitary legal system. The most perfect
expression of this stage in the evolution of law is the civil law, in which
there is only one set of norms, designed, so far as public order and the
social interest in the stability of transactions do not forbid, to provide
for just solutions of all situations which may arise. This union of law
and equity has not yet been reached in Anglo-American law, in which
the long experience of administration of equity in a separate inner
judicial system has created a moral curtain, now heavy with the mold
of centuries, which hangs across our law, shutting off the principles of
equity from the greater part of the law.
The Sense of Justice
A comparison of legal systems from the viewpoint of their equitable
content reveals that the fundamental principles of equity in almost
all legal systems exhibit a striking similarity.86 The most probable ex-
planation of this phenomenon would seem to be that equity is founded
on a sense of justice which is innate in human nature, 7 however diverse
may be the explanations of its presence. Henri Bergson explains the
sense of justice on two grounds; on the ground of a biological com-
p~lsion to promote the interests of the social group, and on the ground
of deliberate choice, which is the unique privilege of human beings,
of ends which conduce to the most effective fulfillment of social goals. 8
361 have attempted to explore this phenomenon in The Role of Equity in the
Harmonization of Legal Systems, 13 Am. U.L. REv. 1, 12-17 (1963); in La Funzione
della pura equita nel diritto moderno, 40 REv. nTERNAzioNALE rDiosoMrr DEL DMrrto
mODERNO (Italy) 647 (1963); and in La Nature de rlquit6 en droit civil, 60 REv.
nTERNATiONALE DE Dnorr coxAmiu (France) 289 (1964).
87 DEL V~ccmo, Soc,.,y AND SoLIuD=E, in Humanit6 et Unit6 du Droit: Essais
de Philophie Juridique 71 (1963), reviewed by the writer in 13 Am. U.L. REv. 248
(1964).
8 8 BEEGsoN, THE Two SouRcEs OF MoPAx=r AND RELiGiON 85 (17th ed. Audra
& Brereton transl. 1956).
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These objectives, which correspond at the human level of evolution to
the objective of survival of the species in the animal world, require for
the attainment of social goals the practice of an altruistic concern for
one's fellow men. Whatever may be the origin of this basic impulse of
human nature, a comparison of the evolution of law in different socie-
ties brings us to the irresistible conclusion that the goals of society,
and therefore the goals of law, tend to approach one another among
peoples m corresponding stages of social development. There is, there-
fore, good reason to believe that the sense of justice is deeply grounded
in instincts which are common to all humanity. If this is so, the princi-
ples of equity might constitute an important link between legal sys-
tems by identifying the common source of innumerable mutations
which obscure what may prove to be an essential similarity between
them. For many centuries the true nature of equity has remained
hidden behind the diverse facades of legal systems. The nature of
equity has been clarified by Kent, Story, Pomeroy and the Harvard
school of equity-Langdell, Ames, Chafee and Pound-but the rela-
tionship of equity to law is still not always clearly understood, and the
areas of law in which the principles of equity are relevant remain badly
defined. If law is to be harmonized across national boundaries on the
basis of the equitable content of legal systems, we must understand
fully the nature of the equitable norms by which the similarity of legal
systems may be tested.
The Nature of Pure Equity
The difficulty of definition to which reference has already been
made arises from the fact that equity is neither separate from, nor is it
identical with law. Thought does not survive without symbolic con-
cepts, and equity is a symbol of the need, originating in deeply seated
impulses of human nature, for a system of justice based on standards
of decent and honorable conduct which have been completely ac-
cepted in religion, ethics, and morals, but which in earlier periods of
legal history were not deemed to fall within the province of law and
which have not yet gained complete acceptance in law. Central in the
commitments of a moral society is the concept of human brotherhood,
from which arises the duty to observe scrupulous good faith in deal-
rags between members of the social community, and the duty to share
the burdens of unanticipated misfortune arising out of human rela-
tionships. Across the vast panorama of legal history, the moral advance
of law has been gradual and intermittent. The need for a symbol to
denote a compassionate system of justice based on the concept of
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human brotherhood arises out of the lag between law and morals.
There are of course many moral ideals which have not yet gained
common acceptance, and many others with regard to which legal sanc-
tions are wholly inappropriate. There are however many moral ideals
which can be effectively translated into principles of law. In law as in
morals, no one should be permitted to take advantage of the unwary,
the needy, or the credulous or to profit from another's misfortune.
In most civil law systems, under the stimulus provided by the early
reception of doctrines of humane and compassionate justice into the
corpus iuris nearly two thousand years ago, the standards of conduct
closely approach the standards which have been established in other
social disciplines. In fully mature legal systems, in which the process
of the humanization of the law is well advanced, there is less need
than in imperfectly developed systems to reduce this fundamental
impulse of human nature to precise expression, which explains the
absence in the civil law of specifically identified principles of equity
as distinguished from principles of law. In Anglo-American law, due
to fortuitous circumstances of early English history, the moral lag has
been accentuated and prolonged, and is still far from overcome. We
have for this reason greater need than in most of the civil law systems
for a body of equitable principles to constitute a guide to a humane
and compassionate system of justice; but since the clashing objectives
of certainty and individual justice have prevented a complete integra-
tion of legal and moral standards even in the civil law, there is need
in all legal systems for specifically formulated principles as objective
criteria of justice. We are accustomed in Anglo-American law to think
of these principles as equity itself, but the principles are merely the
expression of an impulse which converts an impersonal system of law
based on the interests of society as a whole into a compassionate sys-
tem of justice concerned also with the social interest in the individual
life. The importance of realizing that the equitable principles are only
expressions of equity and are not equity itself is because when forms
of law are confused with reality, adaptation of the forms to changing
needs of the place and time becomes much more difficult. The harden-
ing of the principles of equity in nineteenth century Anglo-American
law, a phenomenon which Pound has called the decadence of equity,
indicates that we, like the prisoners in the cave in Plato's famous
simnle,39 may have mistaken the shadows for the reality.
The origin of equity as mitigation of strict law is important to an
understanding of the nature of equity in modern times. In Roman law
9 PLATo, PuBuc *514a-521c.
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the praetorian equity, after nearly five hundred years of administration
as a separate system, merged into the corpus iuris to form a unitary
legal system. In Anglo-American law the equitable system developed
in the English Court of Chancery in the fourteenth century has never
merged completely with the inner common law system, in spite of
statutory efforts in both England and the United States over a period
of more than a hundred years to bring about such a merger, but as a
result of the moral progress of society the principles of equity have
permeated into many common law doctrines. In the Scandinavian,
Hungarian and Soviet legal systems and in the legal systems of the
Orient there has been no transitional stage, and principles of equity,
as soon as they ceased to be administered in the form of royal dispen-
sation, passed directly into the main body of the law. The civil law
in Europe fell heir, between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, to
a system of Roman law in which equity and law had been completely
integrated since the time of Hadrian in the second century of the
Christian era. When law is divided into main and auxiliary systems,
equity constitutes a component of law with characteristics which mark
it as separate and apart from the main body of the law. When the rules
of strict law open to receive the corrective principles of equity as an
integral part of the legal structure, equity ceases to be a separate com-
ponent of law and becomes a quality of the legal norms. Although in
fully mature legal systems equity has ceased to exist as a separate
component of law, it continues to exist as a force which gives shape to
the ideal of decent and honorable conduct in the relations of man with
man.
In early English law the basis of equitable relief was in general a
violation of good faith or the prevention of extreme hardship resulting
from the inadequacy of the ordinary rules of law to provide for just
solutions in particular situations. The requirement of scrupulous good
faith was based on obligations of conscience; and the concept of relief
from extreme hardship beyond that which is normally incident to legal
relationships was based on the canonical institution of imploratio officii
iudices, which provided for relief in cases of extreme hardship. The
concept of relief from hardship required a distribution of responsibility
for the results of accident or mistake, since the relief to one of the
parties usually entailed the relinquishment of some legal right by the
other. In the contemporary stage of legal evolution, relief from hard-
ship is increasingly provided by requiring a sharing of responsibility
by the whole community. Together, good faith and relief from hard-
ship constitute the essence of equity. From the nature of equitable
February, 1965]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
norms, which require, in their application, attention to circumstances
which vary widely from case to case, flows the further principle of an
individualization of justice which has spread throughout the law. Since
the way courts deal with the elements of good faith and-hardship is
necessarily relative to the social need for certainty and to the demand
for a just decision between the individuals immediately concerned, the
decision as to the effect to be given to equitable considerations will
vary as social or individual needs, resting respectively on reason and
ideal justice, appear to the judge or jury to be of predominating
importance.
The conflict between law and equity in Anglo-American law, and
to a real although much less extent in the civil law, is not entirely
due to accidents of history which split our law asunder, or to the de-
liberate and uneven pace of the ethical growth of law throughout the
world. There is an inevitable and permanent clash between the legal
objectives of certainty and ideal justice which has given rise, in all
legal systems, to an ambivalent attitude of law toward equity, to which
law is attracted by reason of the identity of equity in the general sense
with justice, but which law at the same time rejects because of the
inescapable conflict between the goals of certainty and ideal justice.
The result of this ambivalence is that the principles of equity tend,
because of what might be called a law of equitable fission, to disinte-
grate when they are introduced into the unfriendly environment of
strict law. The deeper the penetration of the principles of equity, the
greater, as their force diminishes, is the fragmentation, weakening the
effectiveness of those principles in mitigating the harsh effects of strict
law in particular cases. An example of restrictive application of equita-
ble principles is the doctrine of implied warranty, which is largely
confined to sales of personal property, and is applied to only a very
limited extent in sales or leases of real property.-" Even in quasi con-
tract, although this branch of the law is entirely of equitable origin,
there is no relief in most cases of volunteered services, 41 money paid
by mistake of law,4 or, unless specific relief is sought against the
40 1 TIFFANY, LANDLOnD ANrD TENANT § 86a (1910) (in leases). "The doctrine of
caveat emptor so far as the title of personal property is concerned is very nearly abolished,
but in the law of real estate it is still in full force.... Still more clearly there can be no
warranty of quality of condition implied in the sale of real estate and ordinarily there
cannot be in the lease of it." 4 WILLISTON, CoNTRCrs § 926 (rev. ed. 1936). See 7
WILLISTON, CoN~aACTs § 926a (3d ed. 1963); Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim of Caveat
Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1187 (1931).
4 1
R ESTATEUMNT, RESTITUTION § 2, comment a (1937).
423 COBIN, CoNTRacTs § 617 (rev. ed. 1960); RESTATEMENT, RESTTrUTON § 45
(1937);'Corbin, Quasi-Contractual Obligations, 21 YALE L.J. 533, 543 & n.51 (1912).
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encroacher, mistaken improvements to real property.48 Frequently,
equitable principles are received indirectly, as in the case of the oc-
casional acceptance of the doctrine of frustration of purpose in con-
tracting, under a forced construction of impossibility,44 and in the
granting of relief for unilateral mistake even where the mistake is not
recognizable, under the pretext of recognizability,45 or of a failure of a
meeting of the minds on the subject-matter of the contract.46
It is because of the incomplete reception of equity that even in the
civil law, in which equity and strict law have been integrated for many
hundred years, it is important to preserve a clear conception of the
nature of pure equity. Thus although the function of equity has
changed from mitigation of the strict law in special cases, as it was in
the time of Aristotle, to a humanization of standards of justice by in-
corporating the principles of equity into the rules of law themselves,
equity continues to perform an important function even in integrated
legal systems. The long history of the administration of equity in
Anglo-American law in a separate inner system enables us to identify
the component elements of equity more accurately than is possible in
the civil law, in which a substantive fusion has obscured its equitable
content. Anglo-American equity provides a catalyst by means of which
the equitable content of our own and of other legal systems can be
precipitated for purposes of comparison, the extent of their absorption
of the principles of equity detected, their ethical evolution or "involu-
tion"47 determined, and cases of imperfect integration corrected. There
is also much to be learned by common law lawyers from the civil law,
where the elevated ethical standards of equity are applied, in most
civil law systems, throughout the law.
In the course of time the equitable concepts of good faith and
relief from hardship have crystallized into definite principles: that
rights should be based on substance instead of form; that the law will
not permit the unscrupulous to carry out their plans; that benefits
obtained as a result of accident or mistake must be surrendered to those
who are better entitled to them; that fully intended agreements must
48 Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d (1958); DAwsoN & PALMER, CASES ON RESTrUTiON 552
(1938); RESTATEMENT, REsTr-rroN § 42 (1937). In several states occupying claimants'
statutes have partially abolished the common law rule.
44 Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 Pac. 458, Annot., 1916F
L.R.A. 1 (1916); RESTATEMNT, CONTRACTS § 454 (1932); See Wade, Impossibility
in Contract, 56 L.Q. REv. 519, 533 (1940).
45 CoRBIN, CONTRACrs § 610 (rev. ed. 1960).
46Strong v. Lane, 66 Minn. 94, 68 N.W. 765 (1896); School District v. Olsen
Constr. Co., 154 Neb. 451, 45 N.W.2d 164 (1950).
47DEL VEccmao, EvoLuzioaN ED INVOLUZIONE NEL Dmrrro 138 (3d ed. 1945).
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be carried out; and that unusual hardship resulting from accident or
mistake must be shared, even at the sacrifice of strict legal rights,
and if necessary by the whole community. In Anglo-American law an
additional principle has evolved, that whenever practicable, threatened
violations of rights will be prevented, violations of rights which have
already occurred must be specifically repaired, and fully intended
agreements will be specifically enforced, if irreparable injury would
otherwise occur and if the common law remedy of damages would be
inadequate to provide appropriate redress. These distinctive contribu-
tions of equity to the science of law are the principles of pure equity.
Equity is an approach to justice in accordance with these specific con-
cepts and principles.
It is necessary to interpolate at this point in our study of the
nature of equity the observation that the nature of equitable remedies,
which have been included in the category of fundamental principles
of equity, is not entirely due to the nature of equitable doctrine. The
struggle of the early chancellors to establish their court firmly in the
English judicial system in the face of the jealousy of the common law
courts and bar, led the chancellors to restrict the relief which was
granted in the Court of Chancery to a type of remedy which the com-
mon law courts did not provide-a command to the wrongdoer to
perform his duty. The remedy of specific enforcement found a perfect
prototype in the procedure of the canon law,48 with which the early
chancellors, who were almost all churchmen, were thoroughly familiar.
With regard to methods of enforcement of legal obligations, the two
great master systems, Anglo-American law and civil law, exhibit a sharp
cleavage. In civil law, emphasis on the concept of personal liberty has
led to the rejection of coercion of the person as a means of compelling
the performance of legal obligations. Although in the civil law repara-
tion may be authorized at the wrongdoer's expense, 49 decrees for in-
48 The denunciatio evangelica of twelfth century canon law provided for worldly
redress as well as penitence, BARroLus, TRACTATuS, No. 5.6. It was enforced by excom-
munication, Coing, English Equity and the Denunciatio Evangelica of the Canon Law,
71 L.Q. REv. 223 (1955). Coing concludes at page 232 that "the denunciatio evangelica
was the model of early English equity." Good conscience requires personal activity and
accurate fulfilment of promises, in canon law. The influence of scholastic philosophy
on English equity is discussed in Vinogradoff, Reason and Conscience in Sixteenth
Century Jurisprudence, 24 L.Q. R~v. 373 (1908). Book I of the CAN N LAw, Canon 80
(of the Roman Catholic Church), provides for dispensations, which are defined as
"relaxation of the law."
49 In Houzier c. Sommier, DALLoz, 18.1.44, the plaintiff was given authority to tear
down, at the defendant's expense, a wall which interfered with the plaintiff's use of an
easement over the defendant's property. FEUNCH Crvn CODE arts. 1136, 1143, 1144;
GERmAN Crvm CoDE art. 249.
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junctions, decrees for specific performance, and imprisonment for
contempt, except to an extremely limited extent in German law, are
unknown.50 The equitable growth of the civil law seems not to have
been impaired by the absence of specific enforcement in personam of
legal obligations. It might therefore be not unreasonably argued that
the doctrine of specific enforcement is not, viewed in the context of
universal law, an essential principle of equity.
The areas in which equitable doctrines are applied in our law are
not always clearly discernible, partly because the law of equitable
fission affects the depth in which those doctrines have penetrated into
different areas of law. It is even more difficult to discover the areas of
law in which equitable doctrines have been completely accepted,
because there they have become fused with common law, to be applied
in all cases in which the equitable doctrines are relevant. There are
areas of law in which the equitable concepts of good faith and relief
from hardship have little or no relevance because neither good faith nor
excessive hardship are involved; and there are some areas in which
even the individualized approach of equity to justice is inappropriate
because it is overcome by the social need for certainty. The presence
of equitable doctrines can be best detected by superimposing the
principles of equity upon the juridical norms of any legal system.
Such a process will reveal that the basic equitable concept of relief
from hardship is more pervasive as a fundamental principle of juris-
prudence than is commonly realized. This concept is the basis of
specific relief where damages are inadequate,"' and in many cases
without regard to that factor.5 2 It is also frequently present in a
wide range of rights and duties arising out of unconscionable conduct,
not only that which is actually fraudulent but that which is motivated
by bad faith in any degree,"' since the enforcement of obligations
unfairly induced usually involves hardship to the person who was
deceived. Where breaches of faith are present, a lesser degree of
hardship is required to induce the court to grant relief. Another area
50 There can be no imprisonment for contempt in German law where the services
are unique, 2 GAUPP-STEIN, ZIVILPROSESSORDNUNG 736, 739 (1913). This has been the
rule since 1900, see ROsENBERG, LEmBuCH § 208 at 1008 (6th ed. 1954) for many
illustrations. See also Jann, Contempt of Court in Western Germany, 8 AM. U.L. Ev.
34 (1959).
5 1 Union Pac. Ry. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 163 U.S. 564, 600 (1896) (Fuller,
C.f.); Bromley v. Holland, 7 Ves. Jr. 3, 32 "Eng. Rep. 2 (1802) (Eldon, L.C.);
BoDE.NBEUms, JURUSPRUDENCE 216 (1962).
52STORY, EQUITY JurPRUnENcE § 994 (14th ed. 1918).
5 3 Dale v. Jennings, 90 Fla. 234, 107 So. 175 (1626); 4 PoManoy, EQUITy Junis-
PRUDENCE § 1405(a) (5th ed. 1941).
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in which the influence of the equitable concept of relief from hardship
is strong is contracts which have been made by mistake,54 or which
by reason of changes of circumstances have become extremely burden-
some to one of the parties.55 Still another area is that in which conflicts
of interest require a balancing of the hardship by distributing the
burden between the parties to the contract50 or even, where necessary,
among the whole community. 5 7 The equitable insistence on substance
over form is a manifestation of both the hardship concept and the
concept of good faith. Where hardship is not considerable, the re-
quirement of certainty controls. In the case of extreme hardship,
equity affords relief through an enforced sharing of the consequences
of misfortune. The equitable requirement of good faith is almost
equally pervasive, affecting problems arising, for example, in the
enforcement of contracts, 58 adverse possession in many jurisdictions, 9
54 COBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 608-12 (1950).
55 Stanton v. Herbert, 141 Tenn. 440, 211 S.W. 353 (1919); Bergstedt v. Bender,
222 S.W. 547 (Tex. Com. App. 1920). See generally on frustration in leases, Comment,
43 MICH. L. BEv. 598 (1944).
56 An excellent example of the requirement of sharing the burdens of the conse-
quences of unilateral mistake dn contracting is the "negative interest" doctrine of damages,
first conceived by Jhering in 1860; according to which a promisee, in case of rescission
by the promisor for his unilateral mistake, is protected against loss, although he will
not reap the profits of his bargain. "Cupla in contrahendo, oder Schadensersatz bei
nichtigen oder nicht zur Perfektion gelangten Vertragen." JHERmG, 4 JAmBuCnaa 118
(1861). Jhering's theory is explained in Smith, Four German Jurists, 12 POL. Sm. Q. 21,
43-48 (1897). The doctrine is in force in Louisiana, LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1837
(West 1952); Argentina (see MACHADO, Com:ENTAuos 121-22) (1875); Austria,
AuSTRis Civi. CODE art. 878; China, CHINESE CIViL CODE art. 91; France, JOSSERAN,
Cours de droit civil positif francais 72(2) (2d ed.); Germany, GEuMRm'x CrvIL
CODE art. 122; Italy, ITALnr_ Crvm CODE art. 1223; Switzerland, Swiss CODE OF OBLIGA-
TIONS art. 26 (see ATF 64 119, JT 1939, 158). See Goodrich v. Lothrop, 94 Cal. 56, 29
Pac. 329 (1892); Youngblood v. Daily & Weekly Signal Tribune, 15 La. App. 379, 131
So. 604 (1930); CAL. CODE Civ. Paoc. § 3408. See generally McClintock, Mistake and
the Contractual Interests, 28 MIN. L. lEv. 460 (1944).
5 7 "[T]he risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among
the public as a cost of doing business." Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,
462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). Prosser, The Assault upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1120 (1960).
58 In Kleinberg v. Ratett, 252 N.Y. 236, 169 N.E. 289 (1929), a vendor was denied
specific performance of a contract to buy land because he failed to reveal to the purchaser
the presence of an underground watercourse, although the purchaser, the court held,
was not entitled to recover his down payment. Papinian on an almost precisely similar
state of facts reached the opposite conclusion as to the right to recover the down pay-
ment, DIGEST 19.1.41.
59 Jasperson v. Schamikow, 150 Fed. 571 (9th Cir. 1907); see Daily v. Boudreau,
231 Ill. 228, 83 N.W. 218 (1907); Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 304 N.Y. 95, 106 N.E.2d
28 (1952).
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interference with contractual relationships,60 imperfect performance
of contractual obligations,. 1 encroachment upon property of another,
62
and fiduciary obligations.63
Reason, Justice and the Polarity of Law
There is inherent in all law a polarity which arises out of the un-
ending struggle for supremacy between the need for stability of
rights and institutions, and the need for humane solutions of con-
troversies in accordance with considerations of individual justice.
Stability is attained through norms which allow in their application
only a minimal amount of judicial discretion. The humane element
in law operates through norms which preclude formulation in im-
personal moulds and leave a considerable margin for discretion. In
the beginnings of law it is reason which determines impersonally
the shape of the basic norms of social order. As law becomes human-
ized in the course of the moral progress of mankind, justice requires
that legal norms be not only reasonable but also humane;64 and in
00 Carmen v. Fox Film Corp., 269 Fed. 928 (2d Cir. 1902).
61 Restitution in the case of incomplete performance depends on whether the
builder's breach was wilful. RBsTATEmNT, CoNaTRcTs § 357 (1932); see Note, 45,
CoLum. L. REv. 72 (1945).
6 2 Pass v. Brooks, 125 N.C. 129, 34 S.E. 228 (1899); PomsnmoY, EQuiTY JurasPRuDENcE
§ 390 (5th ed. 1941); see Pound, The Influence of French Law in America, 3 ILL. L.
REV. 354, 361 (1909).
632 Scorr, TnusTs § 170 (2d ed. 1956); NEWMAN, TnusTs 397 (2d ed. 1955);
see Scott, The Trustees Duty of Loyalty, 49 HAv. L. REv. 521, 539 (1936).
64 Equity is "a reasonable and humane approach to human relations." Wen-Yen
Tsao, Equity in Chinese Customary Law, in EssAYs IN HONOR OF RoscoE PouND 21, 22
(Newman ed. 1962). Aristotle said that "in whatever cases one is bound to have a fellow
feeling, these are all cases of equity." RHEroluc, Bk. 1, c. 13. ScnwErrZm,, OuT or My
LIE .N THouGHT 126 (1933), speaks of "the universal ethic of the feeling of
responsibility." "Perhaps we shall even find at times that when talking about justice the
quality we have in mind is charity, this though the one quality is often contrasted with
the other." CAPoozo, THE GnowmH oF T LAw 87 (1924). Charmont, L'Abus du droit,
1 Rkv. TRmmsTRIELLE DE Daorr CwvIL 113, 121 (1902) says that "the frontiers, always
provisional, with the aid of which we have tried to separate charity, justice and law,
have been once more displaced." MuuiBEAD, ELramNrs oF ETHIcs § 88 connects
justice with charity. Matthew 23:23, addressing the scribes (lawyers) and Pharisees,
"[Y]e . . . have omitted the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy,
and faith." Harno, The Precepts We Live By, 2 S.D.L. REv. 19, 20 (1957), refers to
"the realm which recognizes the sway of duty, of fairness, of honest dealing between
men, of sympathy, of taste, and of the spirit." The classification seems to make explicit
what Aristotle may have meant by "fellow feelings." Although Harno considers such
obligations to be unenforceable, he concedes that the domains of obedience to the un-
enforceable and of obedience to law are interrelated and complement each other. Some
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modem times, reason and justice together shape the legal norms. The
contrast between reason and justice is of course far from precise.
Where social interests are particularly important, justice will often
assign to those interests predominating weight, even though some
individual interests may remain unfulfilled;6 5 and reason includes
humanitarian objectives, based on the ascertained moral sense of
the community, 6 which may not be in accordance with the other
interests of society. The transition from subjectivity to objectivity
is perhaps the crowning achievement of law, and the necessity for
limitations on the discretion of judges creates the problem of establish-
ing a balance between certainty and ideal justice. Although the
nature of equitable concepts is such as to resist rigid classification,
this does not prevent the principles of equity from establishing an
equilibrium, so far as this is possible, between certainty and a humane
approach to justice. The fact that norms cannot be verified em-
pirically does not impair either the validity or the workability of
moral postulates; 67 the norms remain valid even though they are
subject to modification as they are tested by experience. The gradual
humanization of law has brought about a change in its structure
from rigid rules to broader and more flexible principles. The settled
principles which are derived from the basic concepts of equity 8
would seem to provide an adequate guide to judicial objectivity69
even in an individualized approach to justice.
In our contemporary culture we can no longer speak of strict law
of these considerations, particularly those of duty, fairness and honest dealing between
men seem to fall within the proper province of law, and are so regarded in equity.
6 5 AL N, LAw iN THE MAEING 379 (6th ed. 1958).
66 "Most of the equitable or discretionary ingredients which are constantly found
in legal systems and which are based on this primary sense of justice are inherent in
the average moral sense of the community." Id. at 405.
67 "Thought does not survive without symbolic concepts. The absence of norms
which can be treated empirically does not impair the validity of moral postulates."
BRoNowsKI, SCmNCE AND HumAN VALUEs 48-51 (1956). Einstein has observed that
modem physics is impossible unless concepts going beyond observed facts are intro-
duced and tested by their deductive consequences. Thr WoRLD AS I SEE IT 35 (1935).
687 BAcoN, Woius 325 (Spedding ed. 1859). See generally 3 POUND, Jurus-
PRUDENCE 513-57 (1959); Patterson, The Case Method in American Legal Education:
Its Origins and Objectives, 4 J. LEcAL En. 1, 15 (1951), referring to the "amazing
fertility" of basic legal concepts which have shown their worthiness to survive; he
adds that "despite twenty-five years or more of washing legal concepts in the cynical
acid of legal realism American courts continue to employ many surviving and pervasive
concepts in their opinions." On the regulae or maxims of equity consult Stein, The Digest
Title, De diversis regulis iuris antiqui and the General Principles of Law, in ESSAYS 3N
JURISPRUDENCE IN HONOR OF RoscoE PouND 1 (Newman ed. 1962).
69 See Clark, The Limits of Judicial Objectivity, 12 Am. U.L. BEy. 1 (1963).
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in the sense of law devoid of moral content. The truth is that we
have no terms corresponding, in the context of modem jurisprudence,
to the Greek "t6Wjog," meaning law applied impersonally, and "nttLSczsa,"
which we translate as equity, but the literal meaning of which
is clemency. Throughout private law except in a few areas of property
law and commercial law, and in public law other than rules of criminal
law and some aspects of administrative law, the term strict law as
the antithesis to equity has become a legal anachronism. In the
following discussion the word "reason" will be used to refer to those
legal norms in which primary emphasis is directed to the social
objective of certainty rather than to individual justice.
How Equity Intervenes in Legal Norms
There are legal norms which rest exclusively on reason; there
are other legal norms which rest on both reason and equity; and there
are, in Anglo-American law and in French administrative law, still
other legal norms which rest on equity alone. In the first category,
where reason is the sole criterion, equity, other than in the general
sense of what is fair and just, has no place. In the second category,
legal norms which rest on both reason and pure equity, in fully
mature legal systems the equitable principle loses its separate identity
and becomes a universal constant of the legal norm, to be applied
wherever the concepts of equity are relevant. In the course of this
integration, rigid rules are replaced by principles into which have
been built the equitable concepts of good faith and relief from hard-
ship. Throughout the civil law and throughout some branches of
Anglo-American law, what were formerly principles of equity have
become fully incorporated into the legal norms. This is also true in
a few limited areas of Anglo-American law, for example in the
doctrine of marketable title. There are however large areas of Anglo-
American law in which equitable principles do not combine with
legal principles to form universal norms applicable in all appropriate
situations. In general in Anglo-American law the application of the
principles of pure equity is confined to suits for specific relief. It
is only in Anglo-American law and in French administrative law,
where the reception of equity is still in the formative stage,"0 that
we find norms of the third category, those which are exclusively
equitable; for example, the Anglo-American doctrines of equitable
7ODrago, The General Principles of Law in the Jurisprudence of the French
Counseil d'Etat, 11 Am. U.L. REv. 126 (1962).
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servitudes71 and equitable waste.7 2 In a fully mature legal system
this third category of legal norms which rest on equity alone, dis-
appears, since in such systems the concepts of equity have become
fully incorporated into the legal norms. An example of complete
integration is the broad concept of unfair conduct as that concept
exists in most civil law systems.73 In this concept the scrupulous
standards of good faith which are required in equity are applied
even in situations in which, in Anglo-American law, only the less
exacting common law standards are applied.
The effect of the principles of pure equity on the common law
can be detected most clearly by tracing the way in which they enter
into legal doctrines. This effect takes place in three different ways.
Sometimes the principles of equity unite with common law principles
to become universal constants throughout the whole range of appli-
cation of the legal doctrine. Sometimes, in the case of legal doctrines
which rest in part on common law principles and in part on principles
of equity, other principles of equity intervene as variants of the
legal doctrine, to replace the equitable constant at points in the
application of the legal doctrine at which those other principles
of equity become relevant. Similarly in the case of doctrines which
rest exclusively on common law principles, the principles of equity
sometimes intervene as variants of the legal doctrine. A few examples
of equitable modifications of common law doctrines in different
branches of the law will illustrate the interrelation of principles of
equity and principles of common law.
An example of a doctrine in which a principle of equity unites
with a common law principle to become a universal constant through-
out the whole range of application of the doctine is the quasi-con-
tractual obligation to restore property acquired in bad faith or by
accident or mistake, or, if rightfully acquired, retained in bad faith.74
In the application of this doctrine, the principles of equity are
applied in nearly all cases which arise in this area of law. A con-
sequence of this integration is that the appropriate principles of
equity are applied in actions for damages as well as in suits for
specific relief. Equity is also a universal constant throughout the
entire range of the doctrine of fiduciary responsibility in the law
71 Sanbom v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925).
72 Vane v. Barnard, 2 Vein. 738, 23 Eng. Rep. 1082 (Ch. 1716).
73 AusTRAN CiviL CODE art. 879; F, Cs t Crv . CODE art. 1116; GmRAN CrvnM
CODE art. 138; ITALIAN CIVIL CODE art. 1337; SCANDINAVAN Cnrm CODE art. 31; Swiss
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS art. 21.
74 Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HAav. L. REv. 97, 107 (1908).
[Vol. 16
FUNCTION OF EQUITY IN THE LAW
of trusts,75 in which the law applies, in actions for damages, the
same norms as are applied in suits for specific relief. Other doctrines
of narrower scope in which pure equity assumes throughout the
entire range of a doctrine the quality of a universal constant are
the obligation, in the law of sales, to mitigate damages;76 priorities
in the law of liens;77 the obligation of a landlord, in some jurisdictions,
to make reasonable efforts to re-let demised premises in cases in
which the tenant has abandoned his lease; 7 accession and confu-
sion, where the controlling considerations are the good faith of
the converter and the hardship he would sustain if he were re-
quired, under some circumstances, to relinquish the product of his
labor;79 contribution and exoneration in the law of suretyship;80 im-
possibility of performance; 81 fraud;82 failure of consideration, 3 and
rescission for innocent misrepresentations in contract law."4 All of
these doctrines originated in equity but have been completely ac-
cepted at law, the extent of the acceptance varying occasionally in
different jurisdictions.
An example of a doctrine of contract law which rests on both
common law and equitable principles and in which other principles
of equity intervene as variants of the legal norm is the doctrine of
pacta sunt servanda, dealing with the enforceability of promises. This
doctrine, which is based in part on common law principles and in
part on the equitable duty to perform promises in good faith, applies,
in the absence of equitable defenses, to all promises which create
legal responsibility. In the absence of equitable defenses, there is
hardly likely to be any reason for shifting to the adversary party
75BOGERT, ThusTs AND ESTATES §§ 484-93, 543-44, 612 (1935); SCOTT, ThusTs
§ 170.25 (2d ed. 1956).
70 Farish Co. v. Madison Dist. Co., 37 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, C.J.);
McCo ax, DA AGES § 173 (1935); WILLSTON, SALES §§ 589, 599(g) (rev. ed.
1948).
77 See Whiteside, Priorities Between Chattel Mortgagee or Conditional Seller and
Subsequent Lienors, 10 ComRNmL L.Q. 331 (1925).
78 Wilson v. Natl Ref. Co., 126 Kan. 139, 266 Pac. 941 (1928); Novak v. Fontaine
Furniture Co., 84 N.H. 93, 146 Ad. 525 (1929).
7 9 See Arnold, The Law of Accession of Personal Property, 22 COLum. L. REV. 103
(1922); Arnold, Confusion, 23 COLUm. L. REv. 235 (1923).
80 See STEARNS, Sur rysHn, 477-99, 508 (3d ed. 1922).
81 Texas Co. v. Hogarth Shipping Co., 256 U.S. 619 (1921); Patch v. Solar Corp.,
149 F.2d (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 741 (1945).
823 Pomamoy, EQurrY JUmiSpRUDENCE § 910 (5th ed. 1941).
83 Anderson v. Yaworski, 120 Conn. 390, 181 At. 205 (1935).
84 5 Wu.asToN, CoNTRsArs § 1500 (rev. ed. 1936). In England rescission is not
allowed where the contract has been executed, Seddon v. North E. Salt Co., [1905]
1 Ch. 326, 322.
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or to the public any part of the responsibility for the loss or damage,
and the decision rests on both reason and equity. When, however,
circumstances are present involving failure of presuppositions of
a contract in cases such as unilateral mistake" or frustration of pur-
pose,86 or in cases of hard bargains, 87 unconscionable conduct less than
fraud,88 or contracts not fully performed by the plaintiff,89 the equitable
principle that good faith requires the performance of promises ceases
to be a constant of the legal norm. Although at this point the common
law would continue to enforce the promise, other principles of
equity come into play as variants of the norm of enforcement and
require relief from the obligation to perform, where special circum-
stances of the foregoing kinds are present. It is only in Anglo-Ameri-
can law, in which the principles of equity have been as yet only
imperfectly received, that a distinction is drawn between the norms
of common law and the norms of equity under circumstances in
which equitable defenses against enforcement of promises are present.
In Anglo-American law the foregoing defenses are generally re-
jected in actions for damages. An example of imperfect reception
of equity in the civil law is the provision of the Portuguese Civil
Code to the effect that error in motive constitutes ground for rescis-
sion of a contract only if the motive, although known to the ad-
versary party, was expressly referred to in the contract 0 It is to
be expected that such equitable defenses, now largely confined in
Anglo-American law to suits for specific relief, will be extended to
actions for damages, as is the case throughout most of the civil law
systems.
An example of a doctrine of the law of torts which rests exclu-
sively on common law principles but in which principles of equity
intervene under circumstances which require the application of
such principles is the doctrine of liability for harm caused by conduct
of the defendant. Under the traditional formula of tort liability, at
any rate since very early times, the defendant's liability exists only
if he was at fault.91 Modem law is beginning to recognize that the
85 CoRBIN, ConTcrs §§ 608-12 (rev. ed. 1960).
86 Authorities cited note 55 supra.
87 Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948).
88 Authorities cited note 53 supra.
89 Authorities cited note 61 supra.
9 0 PORTUGu'£SE CivIL CODE arts. 659. 660.
9 1 KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (1963); PTossm, TORTS 17
(3d ed. rev. 1964); POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF L W 135, 159 (1921);
Isaacs, Fault and Liability, 31 HARv. L. REv. 954, 966 (1918); Pound, The Administra-
tive Application of Legal Standards, 44 A.B.A. REP. 445, 455 (1919).
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public interest may require that responsibility for harm caused by
potentially harmful agencies or property may be attached to con-
duct without fault. 2 Where a choice of the incidence of responsibility
is possible, responsibility is attached to the enterprise which, by
making the risk part of the cost of doing business, can best dis-
tribute the burden among the community through an increase in
the price of the goods or services,9s an application of the equitable
principle of risk-sharing. The principle of strict liability, completely
received into the theory of delictual obligations in the civil law,94
has received only partial acceptance in Anglo-American law. Another
example of a doctrine which rests exclusively on common law
principles is the category of rights arising out of ownership of
property. Such rights are unqualified up to the point at which the
public interest is violated or threatened,95 or at which private interests
arise under circumstances such as adverse possession,96 accession
where property has been greatly increased in value by a finder,97
or acts of nuisance which require a sharing of responsibility for
92 Patterson, The Apportionmaent of Business Risks Through Legal Devices 335, 358
24 CoLu m. L. REv. (1924); Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 69 YA.E L.J. 1099, 1120 (1960).
S
3 In Goldberg v. Kolsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963), it was held that an airplane manufacturer's implied warranty of
fitness of the airplane ran in favor of a passenger despite the absence of privity of con-
tract. The action was dismissed, however, against the manufacturer of the altimeter,
the instrument the failure of which had caused the accident. The court said that it was
unnecessary to so extend the doctrine of strict liability as to hold the manufacturer of
the component part which caused the accident; that "adequate protection is provided for
the passengers by casting in liability the airplane manufacturer .... "Id. at 437, 191
N.E.2d at 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 595. Burke, J., dissenting, pointed out that special insur-
ance is readily available to passengers. "The risk... becomes part of the cost of doing
business and can be effectively distributed among the public through insurance or by
direct reflection in the price of the goods or service." Id. at 440, 191 N.E.2d at 85,
240 N.Y.S.2d at 598. Burke, J. thought however that this should be done by the legis-
lature. See Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24
CoLum. L. PaEv. 335, 358 (1924); Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability
to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1120 (1960).
94 "Every act which causes injury to another binds the person by whose fault the
damage occurred, to repair such damage." FRENcH Cvrm CODE art. 1382. See also ibid.
art. 1384; GERMAN Civii. CODE art. 823, ITALIAN Civiri. CODE art. 1151, Swiss CODE OF
OBLIATIONS art. 41.
95 Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Ryan v. City of Emnetsburg,
232 Iowa 600, 4 N.W.2d 435 (1942); Powell, The Relationship Between Property Rights
and Civil Rights, 15 HAsTiNcs L.J. 135 (1963).
96 Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 41 (1837).
97Arnold, The Law of Accession of Personal Property, 22 COLuJm. L. REv. 103
(1922).
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thedamage.9 8 In all these situations, equitable principles may require
a qualification of legal rights and obligations.
When principles of equity unite with principles of common law
to form legal norms which are the basis of either causes of action
or defenses, the effect is to introduce into the law, without regard
to the nature of the remedy which is sought by the plaintiff, doctrines
which may lead to different results than if such doctrines were not
applied. Putting the matter differently, this result comes about where
the equitable element in the norms upon which the cause of action,
or the defense, is based, has been accepted as a legal cause of action
or defense. There is however a large area of Anglo-American law,
actions in which the only remedy sought or available is damages,
in which the principles of equity do not always unite with common
law principles. The result is that in actions for damages the principles
of equity are not applied in all cases in which the basic equitable
concepts of good faith and relief from hardship are relevant. Our
jurisprudence has displayed remarkable ingenuity, although the
results have been highly undesirable, in curtailing the extension of
equitable doctrine. The basic equitable concept of good faith has
been divided into fraud and unconscionable conduct short of fraud,
and in most actions for damages only flagrant bad faith is con-
demned. The basic concept of relief from hardship has been divided
into hardship for which damages constitute "adequate" compensa-
tion, and hardship which cannot be adequately compensated in that
manner. Only where the hardship would be irreparable are equitable
principles ordinarily applied. By another even more ingenious opera-
tion, which has been successfully performed only in the legal labora-
tories of the English speaking part of the world, all law has been
divided into actions for damages and suits for specific relief, an
operation which, since equitable principles are generally reserved
for only one such type of action, actions for specific relief, severely
limits the scope of those principles. The reasons for all these
examples of judicial surgery, which are to be found in the political
history of the middle ages and the problem of making the English
Court of Chancery a viable part of the judicial system, do not
concern us now. The result is, however, that the benefit of the
system of elevated moral principles which constitute the supreme
contribution of equity to law has been withald from by far the
98 Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658
(1904); Note, Noise Nuisances: Commercial Enterprises v. Owner of Residental Property,
7 VAND. L. REv. 695 (1954).
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largest number of cases which come before the .courts, those in
which the only remedy sought or available is damages, and is re-
served for a relatively minor segment of our law, suits in which
the circumstances afford the opportunity for specific relief. In the
greater part of our law we give preference to lower over higher
moral standards, and to the less effective remedy, damages, over
the more effective method of enforcing rights, specific relief. These
are some of the anomalies of Anglo-American equity which foreign
scholars find it hard to understand, and which invite the attention
of the legal profession in the United States and in England to the
solutions which have been reached in other legal systems. There
are good reasons in many situations for granting only equitable, or
only legal relief as the case may be, or for giving or denying con-
trolling effect to an equitable defense. There should be a better
reason for determining the relevance of equitable considerations in
deciding the merits of a cause of action, or of a defense, than the type
of relief which is sought by, or is available to, the plaintiff. If the
ethical standards upon which the principles of pure equity are
based are proper factors in deciding cases in which specific relief
is requested, there is usually no good reason why those standards should
not be regarded as equally relevant in cases in which the plaintiff
asks only for damages. The reason why equitable principles were
restricted, in the distant past, to suits for specific relief, was not
that equitable principles were thought to be relevant only in suits
for specific relief, but because only such suits could be brought
in the courts of equity, which were the only courts in which those
principles were applied. The assumption that the principles of
equity are relevant only in suits for specific relief, and are not relevant
in most actions for damages, is entirely unwarranted by the facts
of legal history. The consequence of the assumption is that we are
allowing substantive rights and obligations to be decided on the
basis of the nature of the remedy which is sought or available; although
everyone agrees that the difference in remedy has no bearing what-
ever on the relevance of equitable principles to the decision of the
case, and although many of the major procedural reforms in the
United States and in the British Commonwealth for more than a
century have been directed toward the abolition of the distinction.
Conclusion
It is evident that the effect of the principles of equity on legal
norms is to transform a relatively impersonal system of law based
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primarily on reason, into a humanitarian system in which considera-
tions of decent and compassionate conduct play an important role.
Although it is difficult to weigh the effect of such imponderables,
there seems to be little reason to doubt that in the unending process
of the humanization of the law, equity is, in the words of Jose Puig
Brutau, one of the world's great comparatists, "one of the names
under which is concealed the creative force which animates the
life of the law."99 The halting and imperfect reception of the prin-
ciples of equity in Anglo-American law is not because we are un-
aware that they exist. Their presence and nature have been demon-
strated throughout the many hundred years during which equity has
constituted a separate inner system in Anglo-American jurisprudence.
In almost all legal systems other than our own, substantially identical
principles, except for the principle of enforcement in personam, are
applied in all cases in which they are relevant, as is also true in
parts of our own legal system. No instance of acceptance in Anglo-
American law of the principles of equity has ever been reversed except
in the field of quasi contract, where modern law is occupied in regain-
ing the lost ground. Events of remote history which gave rise to a dual
system of law and equity are allowed to continue to impress on our
legal system a dual standard of morality. As Lord Radcliffe has recently
reminded us, "every system of jurisprudence needs . . . a constant
preoccupation with 'the task of relating its rules and principles to
the fundamental moral assumptions of the society in which it be-
longs."100 If we are to maintain a measure of harmony between the
moral progress of mankind and the moral progress of the law, the
law cannot ignore the moral standards which are the enduring basis
of our civilization.
Out of the mists of history emerges the figure of a shepherd who
dreamed, in a time of moral regression, of human brotherhood.
There is surely some relation between his dream and the fact that he
was, according to the sacred writings of his people, the first to recog-
nize that when equity cannot enter, justice stands afar off. 10' The
99Puig Brutau, Juridical Evolution and Equity, in EssAYs xN Ju ispnuDmcE IN
HoNoR oF RoscoE PouND 82,84 (Newman ed. 1962).
100 RADmc-E, THE LAw AND rrs Co Ass 63-64 (1960).
10.1
"And judgment is turned away backward,
And justice standeth afar off;
For truth is fallen in the street,
And equity cannot enter." Isaiah 59:14 (King James).
In the Soncino edition of the book of Isaiah, the Hebrew word "nikoclha" in
59:14 is translated by the word "uprightness," in contrast to its translation in the King
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problem which was revealed to the great unknown Isaiah continues
to confront modem jurisprudence. The main obstacle to the sub-
stantive fusion of equity and law is our failure to recognize that
equity has become, in the course of the march of the human spirit,
an integral part of justice. There can be no complete or accurate
picture of the structure of law unless its equitable content is taken
fully into account; nor can the law fulfill its function of nourishing
and enriching the growth of the human spiritV0 2 unless its equitable
elements are fully committed to the task.
James version of the bible by the word "equity"; see Isaiah, SoNcINo BooKs oF TrE
BmrE 290 (1949). The translation of the verse in the Soncino edition is as follows:
"And justice is turned away backward,
And righteousness standeth afar off;
For truth hath stumbled in the broad place,
And uprightness cannot enter."
1
0 2 RAnDc , op. cit. supra note 100, at 64.
